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BY JUSTIN FISHER*
THE FINANCING of Britain's political parties has again been brought
into sharp focus. Whilst the Home Affairs Select Committee Report of
1994 (Funding of Political Parties) recommended no substantive
changes in the ways in which parties are funded, two factors have
ensured that the question has remained on the political agenda. First,
growing concern over propriety in public life led to the establishment of
the Committee on Standards in Public Life, chaired by Lord Nolan. The
committee did not publicly examine party finance, but, as is often the
case, political scandal led to calls for an examination of party dona-
tions.1 Secoondly, there has been a continuing growth in large donations
made by wealthy individuals, a tendency which is not wholly new but
has become much more widespread. What is significant, however, is the
fact that these donations are no longer directed almost solely to the
Conservative Party: the major change has been that large voluntary
donations are now also received by the Labour Party. However, whilst
there have been new developments in party finance, two principal
concerns about voluntary donations remain. First, whether donations
should be publicly disclosed and, second, whether donations of the size
that have been reported are desirable for the democratic health of
political parties.
The prominence and type of voluntary donations to political parties
has varied over time. Pinto-Duschinsky identifies the initial development
growing after the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883, with
Victorian businessmen making donations, in many cases in return for
honours—this is commonly known as the plutocratic period.2 Such
practices continued until around 1922 and had a strong effect upon the
internal structure of the Conservative Party. Despite the widespread
practice by both the Conservative and Liberal parties, the effective sale
of honours required the affairs of Conservative central party finances to
be kept secret to avoid confirmation of the practice. Formal party
accounts were avoided and contributions were often held by the main
party fund-raisers, the secrecy of the operation meaning that fund-
raising involved only a small number of people. In fact, it seems that
little has changed in terms of the apparent secrecy with which Conserv-
ative funds are collected. Many details of the party's finances are kept
strictly confidential and those involved in central fund raising appear to
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be a small and closed group. Moreover, reports at the time of the 1993
select committee enquiry on party funding suggested that donations
may well have been paid to central fund raisers themselves. In short, the
sale of honours may have ended but the effects of the plutocratic era
upon Conservative party organisation have remained.
The beginnings of institutional rather than individual funding (the
modern era) after 1922 lie with the formation of the Labour Party,
which received funds largely from trade unions. The move towards
corporate institutional funding by the Conservative Party, though by no
means immediate, was largely a response to this growing labour
movement. Donations were sought from the business community which
was concerned about the rise of socialism and organised labour.
Developments were also spurred on by a desire within the Conservative
Party to distance itself, in image and probably practice, from the
dealings in honours. After the second world war, institutional corporate
funding became entrenched as a major form of Conservative central
party finance. There was high taxation in the post-war period and,
unlike the first world war, the second produced no new millionaires,
with less scope for large individual donations as a consequence.
However, there have been important developments in recent years
which suggest that a new era of political finance may well be upon us.3
This has been characterised by two principal developments: the re-
emergence and growth of large personal contributions and the develop-
ment of commercial approaches to party fund-raising. These forms of
fund-raising have included high-profile party dinners and, unlike vol-
untary donations, they have provided participants with some selective
benefits in return. For example, a party political dinner that costs £500
or more is arguably a donation: participants can enjoy a meal and have
an opportunity to meet senior politicians. This contrasts with straight-
forward donations which theoretically afford no such benefits. Yet it is
important to note that access to politicians in itself is not necessarily a
route to political influence. It may be used with varying degrees of skill,
on which success may partly depend. Moreover, there is no guarantee
that the individual or party that has been accessed will act upon cases
that are put forward, or even take much notice. Nevertheless, those that
do receive political access do at least plausibly have an advantage over
those that do not.
Political and organisational background
These changes in party finance should be viewed against some critical
backdrops. The Conservative Party has experienced grave problems
both politically and organisationally. Politically, it has been unpopular,
particularly since the exit of sterling from the Exchange Rate Mechan-
ism on 16th September 1992. The mean opinion-poll rating of the party
from the 1992 general election prior to that event was 42.7% whilst the
mean rating for the remainder of 1992 was 34.6%. This downward
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trend has continued, such that the mean poll ratings in 1993, 1994 and
1995 were 29.7%, 25.3% and 24.9% respectively. These poor ratings
have also been reflected in European and local elections. The Conserva-
tives have sustained so many losses that they are now only the third
party in terms of local government seats, whilst in the European
elections of 1994 the party polled 27.9% of the vote and won only 18
seats. It has also been beset with scandals and has had a significant
number of ministerial resignations. Organisationally, there are other
predicaments. In recent years it has faced the problem, at a central level
at least, of a considerable net deficit. By 1994/95, this stood at £15
million having reached £19.2 million in 1992/93. The Conservative
Party has only published details of net liabilities since 1993, so we
cannot be sure for how long it has experienced this problem. Certainly,
it has often outspent its income in individual years, although it does
appear that much (not all) of the current deficit has been brought about
by organisational overspending4 and the deficits involved have dwarfed
those run by other parties. Nevertheless, the party has had some success
in reducing its liabilities, such that the declared deficit at the end of the
financial year 1995/96 stood at £7,538,000.
By way of contrast, the Labour Party has had far better fortune both
politically and organisationally. In terms of opinion polls it has enjoyed
consistently improved ratings. Thus from the 1992 election to the end
of that year, its mean rating was 42.7%, and for 1993, 1994 and 1995
it was 45.3%, 51.8% and 56.8% respectively. In terms of local
government seats it is Britain's leading party, whilst in the European
elections of 1994 it built on the successes of 1989, securing 44.2% of
the vote and 62 seats. Organisationally, Labour has also been successful.
Traditionally less effective in attracting large individual donations, one
of its recent initiatives, the Labour Party Business Plan, has largely been
financed by individual donations from members or supporters, or by
activities such as high-profile dinners which attract money from indi-
viduals rather than institutions. Since the Business Plan was established,
it has been very successful in continually increasing its fundraising
capacity, such that it now provides a quarter of central income. In
general, then, it is clear that the Labour Party is diversifying its income
base and, whilst trade unions continue to play a very important financial
role, it has been successful in harnessing significant income from
individuals. The result of Labour's improved organisational skills is that
the party has been able to generate regular surpluses. Since 1990, it has
generated these in all but two years and is now enjoying net current
assets of nearly £3 million.
Trends in party income
These political trends have been reflected in patterns of voluntary
donations for both the Conservative and Labour parties. Indeed, part
of the reason for the Conservative Party's financial difficulties has been
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the loss of prominent corporate donors or at least considerable falls in
donation size. To be sure, donations do vary in amount and number
depending upon the general election cycle, a fact which causes problems
for parties since funding is required on a much more consistent basis.5
Nevertheless, the Conservatives have suffered particularly badly in this
Parliament. Prominent corporate donors such as United Biscuits (whose
former chairman, Lord Laing, was an enthusiastic supporter of Mrs
Thatcher), Taylor Woodrow, Allied Lyons (now Allied Domecq),
Argyll, British Airways and Smithkline Beecham have all ceased dona-
tions, at least temporarily, in the past three years. A part explanation is
falling profits. However, more seriously for the Conservative Party,
some companies have reported a desire to avoid shareholder discontent
as well the view that a company operating in an international environ-
ment should avoid funding one domestic political party. If such reasons
are genuine, this indicates that donations may be less likely to be
forthcoming in the future. Firstly, many companies have paid little
regard to possible shareholder objections to political donations in the
past.6 Secondly, the sensitivity to funding a domestic party when one is
operating in an international context mirrors the reluctance of many
multi-national companies to engage in political activity in the form of
donations at national level.7
Nevertheless, the Conservatives have had some success in attracting
new sources of income, though many of these have not been without
controversy. Continuing a trend that had become apparent by the
beginning of the decade, the party appears to be still be attracting
money from abroad.8 It was reported in 1994 that Peter Woo of Warfe
Holdings, a prominent Hong Kong company, had made a donation of
£200,000. Woo's father-in-law was Sir Y.K. Pao, the former chairman,
who himself was reported to have been a regular donor (Observer, 2/5/
94). Also from Hong Kong, donations of £100,000 are reported to have
continued from Li Ka-Shing, a prominent businessman, whilst Stanley
Ho, who operates in Macao, is also reported to have donated £100,000
(Guardian, 22/5/96). Perhaps most damaging for the Conservatives
were the reports that the party had accepted a donations from indi-
viduals linked with the war in the former Yugoslavia: first from Zanic
Tanicie, a Yugoslav-born businessman (now a British citizen) who was
a director of two firms on a US Treasury sanctions blacklist drawn up
as a result of the war; secondly, the party was alleged to have received
donations from an associate of the Serbian Rodovan Karadzic. Whilst
the party denied any wrongdoing, it did nevertheless announce an
internal investigation.
The Conservative Party has also looked to other techniques of
fundraising which provide selective benefits. It has emerged that two
'clubs' operate: the Premier club and the Millennium club, membership
of which is on a varying financial scale, members being offered benefits
accordingly. The Premier club, established in November 1995 report-
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edly offers two tiers of membership: the tier costs £10,000 and brings
invitation to suppers with ministers (these have included Michael
Hesiltine and Roger Freeman); the second tier, costing £100,000, offers
invitations to two dinners which the Prime Minister attends. The
Millennium Club has emerged from the Conservative Industrial Fund, a
historic funding body within the party: for a minimum subscription of
£2,500 potential members are offered 'a unique networking opportunity
to meet and interact with senior ministers at lunches, receptions and
private functions' (Observer, 28/7/96). Reports alleged that the admin-
istrators of the clubs advise potential members that payments need not
be disclosed as political donations in company accounts but can be
itemised as 'entertainment'. {Observer, 21/7/96). Where such club
memberships are classified as other than donations, there is a arguably
a potential legal problem since it is contestable that the high subscrip-
tions is effectively a donation. Of course, not all members may be
representing corporate interests. Indeed, reports indicate that the targets
for membership were individuals and private companies that had 'done
extremely well from a Conservative government' (Observer, 21/7/96)
because corporate money had been harder to solicit. Nevertheless, this
fundraising technique may well raise ethical questions about the use of
titles of state in order to raise funds for a political party. That said, it is
important to emphasise again that access itself is no guarantee of
realising commercial ends, while access may also be available to non-
member companies or individuals. Nevertheless, in pluralist resource
terms, gains are clearly being made by virtue of making payments.
Despite these fundraising successes, the Conservative Party has still
faced difficulties in reducing its overdraft. As a result, loans have been
secured from a variety of sources. Constituency parties have made
interest-free loans, which present few democratic problems. More
noteworthy are reports that the party was loaned money from private
sources and, in particular, a sum of £4 million on an interest-free basis
by a member of the family of the entrepreneur Sir Graham Kirkham.
The loan was apparently designed to help reduce the party's overdraft
in order to improve negotiations with the party's bankers. Moreover,
some suspect that the loan has now been turned into a gift. This raises
very serious questions, since the loan or gift would be the largest
recorded single donation and would dwarf other donations as well as
most payments from trade unions to the Labour Party, even in an
election year.
A trend that has continued, as distinct from the changes mentioned
above, is the suspicion that donors are rewarded by Conservative
governments. Traditionally, donations have attracted criticism because
it was claimed that honours were awarded to those who contributed
personally or whose companies did so. Indeed, such assertions are
almost the stuff of popular folklore. More serious, perhaps have been
claims in the most recent debates about party finance that donations are
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now being rewarded in financially beneficial ways through quangos.
Analyses by the Labour Party and the press have suggested that board
membership often seems to involve individuals associated with party
donations. Certainly, there appears to be some correlation with reports
that 150 of the 450 directors who sit on the board of the top 100 FTSE
companies which had made donations have been appointed to quangos,
whilst there were only 50 appointments from the remaining 480
directors in the FTSE top 100 companies which had not made donations
(Guardian, 29/11/94). If there is any truth in such claims, this presents
a far more serious scenario than patronage through the Honours List,
since membership of such agencies is more likely to be able to produce
economic benefit.
One of the major new developments in party finance has been the
readiness of individuals and businesses to support Labour through
donations. It has received both corporate and individual donations in
the past, although the former have tended to be few in number and of
small value, while the latter, have not been of anything like the size
received by the Conservatives. However, details have recently emerged
of a change in these trends. First, the Labour Party accepted a donation
of £l million from the animal welfare group, Political Animal Lobby
(PAL). The group had made donations to Labour in the past, as well as
smaller ones to the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and other parties,
but this was its largest single donation. (PAL's founder reportedly paid
£17,500 for the footballer Eric Cantona's FA Cup Final shirt at a
Labour fund-raising event). It could be added that Labour's financial
links with animal welfare groups extend back to 1979, when the League
Against Cruel Sports made a donation of £80,000 to the election
campaign.
The declaration of the PAL donation was followed by news that the
then vice-chairman of Chelsea Football Club, the late Matthew
Harding, had also given £l million. Apart from the obvious delight of
Labour, the news was particularly poignant since guests of Harding at
Chelsea had regularly included the Prime Minister and David Mellor,
both Chelsea supporters. It also emerged that Bob Gavron, a printing
entrepreneur, had donated £500,000, arguing that the Conservatives
were no longer the automatic party of business; an observation that has
been predicted in previous research.9 Other individuals have also made
contributions of over £5,000 (the figure set by Labour to trigger
declaration by the party). These have included the publisher, Paul
Hamlyn, who has contributed to Labour in the past, and Philip Jeffrey,
former owner of the New Statesman. Tony Blair was also the recipient
of contributions for his leadership campaign in 1994 from Barry Cox,
Melvyn Bragg and Greg Dyke, all associated with London Weekend
Television, as well as from David Sainsbury of the supermarket chain,
who had provided substantial personal funding for the SDP in the
1980s.
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Labour has also been partially successful in recruiting corporate
financial support. The media group, Pearson contributed £25,000 (also
donated to the Conservatives) and the sugar producer Tate & Lyle
reduced its contribution to the Conservative Party and made a donation
to Labour, significant because Tate &c Lyle has had a long history of
opposition to Labour every since the party floated the idea of national-
ising the sugar industry in 1949. All of these donations were revealed
by the Labour Party under its ruling that donations above £5,000
should be declared (though in the annual report no figures are given).
However, it also emerged that Labour has received donations through
routes as circuitous as the Conservatives, it being claimed that it uses
the Industrial Research Trust to fund research projects by the leadership.
It was to this organisation that the Caparo Group reportedly donated
£47,000, which was not disclosed under the party's normal policy, and
it emerged that the Caparo Group had previously donated £130,000.
The Industrial Research Trust was also reported to have been supported
by 20 or 30 individuals (Observer, 8/9/96).
Despite Labour's success in attracting these new sources of income, it
has nevertheless been compelled to revise its position on accepting
donations of such magnitude. The shadow Chancellor, Gordon Brown,
argued in 1994 that large corporate donations to political parties were
'against the interests of democracy' (Guardian, 22/8/94). Yet, whilst the
corporate donations that Labour has received are smaller than many of
those received by the Conservatives, the donations from the Political
Animal Lobby, Matthew Harding and Bob Gavron are not. Moreover,
if one is critical of the democratic impact of donations of this magnitude,
it is difficult to see why one should differentiate between the sources of
such payments, institutional or individual, even if they are made public.
These donations have occurred against a backdrop of some uncer-
tainty about the future role of trade union involvement in the Labour
Party. Unions continue to contribute more than half of Labour's central
income (1995 — 54.2%), though the trend appears to be for this
proportion to be in decline, even allowing for fluctuations during the
electoral cycle.10 Nevertheless, the fundraising and organisational devel-
opments in the Labour Party have meant that the role of the unions has
come under increasing scrutiny. Ironically, this has occurred at a time
when unions are seemingly more popular than in the past. An August
1996 NOP poll found that many saw a positive role for unions and felt
that government reforms had gone too far. That said, in another poll
only 43% of Labour supporters wanted the current payment and voting
rights arrangements for the unions to continue, whilst 23% thought
that the whole arrangement should end, a similar number willing to
continue the financial but not the organisational relationship. This
mirrors concerns amongst party members that unions had too much
power in the party and that the block vote brought the party conference
into disrepute.11 Labour leaders, however, would presumably be unwill-
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ing to sever financial ties with the unions unless comprehensive state
funding is introduced, since voluntary donations by their very nature
lack reliability and moreover tend to cycle around general elections.
Since parties need to operate on a day-to-day basis as well as campaign
in other elections, any move to end a stable source of finance without
adequate replacement would be unwise. Put simply, the Labour Party
cannot afford to lose this support, despite its current success in securing
substantial forms of income from elsewhere.
The problem of voluntary donations
Overall, the question of voluntary donations raises both normative and
practical concerns. From a normative perspective, an initial considera-
tion is whether recipients should declare the identity of contributors.
The reasons advanced for this are threefold. First, transparency in
political conduct is useful in the fight against corruption. Secondly,
disclosure can help maintain public confidence in the democratic
political process: secrecy can breed suspicion and confidence is more
likely if unnecessary secrecy is removed. Thirdly, since parties are
competing for the highest office in democratic government, the public
simply has a 'right to know' how they are financed. The normative
counter-argument (according to the Home Affairs Committee) is that
donations are a private matter for individuals and that the interest of
'inquisitive journalists, political opponents or even the state' is not
legitimate. Moreover, since individual companies are bound by the
Companies Act to declare any political donations in their annual report,
parties have no need to replicate this information.
On a practical level there are also objections. First, whether there
ought to be a threshold beyond which donations should be declared.
From a normative perspective, the case for privacy when contributing a
sum of say £20 is commonly accepted, though for larger donations
there is arguably a case for disclosure. The practical objection to this is
that any threshold that is set will have a varying impact depending upon
the size of the party concerned. A threshold of £1,000 might identify
donors that are critical to a small party's finances and thus potentially
capable of some leverage: identification would arguably then be in the
interests of transparency and public confidence. On the other hand, the
same threshold for a larger party would entail identification of donors
not having a substantial financial impact upon the party (however
helpful their contribution). From this point of view the privacy of the
small donor to a large party would be contravened. Of course, one
might take the view that any contribution, however small ought to be
declared, but at a practical level there are administrative considerations
for larger parties in attempting to identify large numbers of smaller
donations.
The other practical objection is whether declaration could be
enforced. Certainly, comparative evidence shows that parties and their
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contributors have been willing and able to contravene regulations such
as these.12 Nevertheless, whilst the prospects of enforceability must be
considered in any regulation, it seems a peculiar premise to assume that
political parties, entrusted with so much by citizens, will inevitably
circumvent legislation. It may be that attempts to regulate such matters
elsewhere have simply been poorly conceived. The failure of badly
drafted legislation in other democracies need not deter any potential
regulation in the United Kingdom.
Despite these arguments, the Select Committee on Home Affairs
report rejected the declaration of donors. Both the Labour Party and
the Liberal Democrats supported the idea, but as yet only the former
has put its policy into practice, declaring all donations over £5,000.
Whilst this move may be considered welcome, further normative
consideration emerges as to whether declaration is sufficient. There may
be democratic concerns where a party receives a considerable propor-
tion of its income from one source. The amounts that Labour secures
from individual trade unions has long been public knowledge, rather
easier to obtain than information regarding individual company dona-
tions, yet concerns have remained about the amounts that have been
provided by the larger unions. Similarly, though the Labour Party has
declared that the Political Animal Lobby has contributed £l million,
thus satisfying both transparency and any perceived public 'right to
know', public confidence may not be reassured by the fact that this one
source provided 6.6% of the party's total central income figure in 1995
and that three sources (PAL, Harding and Gavron ) provided 16.6%
(calculated against a total of £15 million).
It may be argued, therefore, that limits should be placed upon the size
of any individual donation. This is for three principal reasons. First,
parties in receipt of large donations may be so unfairly advantaged that
electoral competition becomes distorted. Secondly, parties should not
become over-dependent on a narrow income base: this is a practical
consideration (as well as one concerned to avoid illegitimate pressures)
because withdrawal of a large donation could result in a party experi-
encing financial difficulty. Thirdly, by limiting the size of an individual
donation parties would be required to widen their supporter base and
thus increase popular political involvement. The normative counter-
argument for these claims is that individuals and groups have a
democratic right to support any legitimate political cause to the extent
of their own choice. Moreover, on a practical note, problems of
enforcement arise. Once again, however, one must consider whether it
is a reasonable premise to expect political parties to disobey regulations.
That said, recommendations to limit the size of contributions were
rejected by the Home Affairs Committee.
Finally, the question of donations from abroad has continued and
especially in relation to these one may question whether declaration is
sufficient. All three main parties have received some contributions from
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abroad, though those received by the Conservatives have been consider-
ably larger. Democratic considerations arise. Those that view the
practice as acceptable argue that any citizen or business with legitimate
interest in the political future of the country should be able to make a
contribution; this being particularly relevant in dependencies like Hong
Kong or companies operating in the Single European Market. The
counter-argument is that economic interests do not bestow the rights of
citizenship and that whilst trade does cross national boundaries, such
things as the provision of welfare services to citizens do not.
Current trends in voluntary donations give rise to other practical
concerns. Whilst new forms of income are welcomed by political parties,
they remain underfunded. Running a party is an expensive business,
and it is clear that none of the parties can maintain organisations at an
acceptable level. It is quite remarkable that the most successful party
(the Conservatives) falls into such deep financial debt. Although the
parties do not depend entirely on voluntary support, the assistance
given by the state is largely directed at elections. The fact that party
activity needs to be maintained beyond any electoral cycle suggests that
such subsidies are insufficient.13 The Home Affairs Committee did not
endorse increased state funding nor any substantive change in the
current arrangements but since state funding is both Labour and Liberal
Democrat policy, a change in government may put the matter under
review again. The main point about voluntary funding, however, is that
it is unreliable. Donations can be withdrawn as easily as they begin,
though regular donations can become a custom.14 Parties would be well
advised not to rely too heavily upon large donations, especially from
individuals. In an organisation, at least, a collective commitment can
emerge which may help ensure continuing financial support for a party,
though it appears that key personnel are an important influence upon
continuing institutional support.15 Obviously, this becomes accentuated
with individual donations: whilst partisan identification can easily
spread throughout a family, the willingness to contribute money may
not.
Conclusions
The developments in party donations and finance in general suggest
that parties' financial fortunes may be linked to their political ones.
Thus the Conservative Party appears to be seeing the erosion of some
of its traditional fund-raising community. It continues to be resourced
partly by companies and often by wealthy individuals. However, whilst
corporate donations have declined before, they have rarely found their
way into Labour's coffers. To be sure, the Conservatives are still the
largest recipient of corporate donations, but some donors are now also
funding Labour, a situation that would have been unlikely ten years
ago. This is bad news for the Conservatives, since not only are their
political opponents benefiting, but it spells potential danger for their
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existing finances. The Conservatives have benefited in the past from
negative corporate images of Labour.16 Now that prominent companies
are happy to assist Labour, one wonders for how long the Conservatives
will be able to benefit from Labour's poor reputation in parts of the
business world. The same is also true to an extent for individual
donations. Again, whilst Labour does not generally receive donations
of the same magnitude as the Conservatives, the fact that some are
willing to contribute large amounts has implications for those that have
supported the Conservatives because of their antipathy to Labour. All
this may change. On the one hand, should Labour become the govern-
ment and experience difficulties, new found support may ebb and even
move to the Conservatives. On the other hand, if Labour is again denied
power, then donors may see little point in supporting a party which
appears unable to win. For these reasons, Labour would perhaps be
unwise to rely too much on voluntary donations and reduce the financial
input of more regular sources of income. There are also democratic
concerns linked to these practical considerations. It is worth considering
whether parties as the principal agents of representative democracy
should be so heavily funded (and sometimes effectively bailed out) by
the apparent philanthropy of particular individuals. The case for more
comprehensive state funding, based upon the need to finance parties
adequately, arguably becomes more pressing with each new develop-
ment in party finance.
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